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INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND AUDITORS’ MORAL REASONING:
A CANADA-U.S.A COMPARISON

ABSTRACT: This paper compares the moral reasoning of 363 auditors from Canada and the
United States. We investigate whether national institutional context is associated with
differences in auditors’ moral reasoning by examining three components of auditors’ moral
decision process: (1) moral development, which describes cognitive moral capability, (2)
prescriptive reasoning of how a realistic accounting dilemma ought to be resolved and, (3)
deliberative reasoning of how a realistic accounting dilemma will be resolved. Not surprisingly,
it appears that institutional factors are more likely to be associated with auditors’ deliberative
reasoning than their prescriptive reasoning in both countries. Additionally, our findings suggest
that the national institutional context found in the United States, which has a tougher regulatory
and more litigious environment, appears to better encourage auditors to deliberate according to
what they perceive is “the ideal” judgment as compared to the Canadian context. We then discuss
the implications of these findings for regulators and for ethics research.
Keywords: National Institutional Context, Moral Reasoning
Data Availability: Contact the first or second author concerning data availability.
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BACKGROUND
In the U.S., the Senate, the Congress and the SEC are investigating the auditors of Enron,
Andersen, and in particular Andersen’s admission that it shredded key files documenting the
audit procedures followed. Under substantial public pressure in light of Andersen’s actions,
Harvey Pitt, chairman of the SEC has recently announced plans to revise the requirements to
which auditors in the U.S. must adhere (i.e., institutional context) (Byrnes, 2002; McFarland,
2002). Although the prospect of increased regulatory intervention suggests a need to understand
whether institutional context may have an effect, there does not yet appear to be evidence that
institutional context may influence auditors’ moral reasoning.
To that end, this paper compares auditors from Canada and the United States to
investigate whether national institutional context may be associated with their moral reasoning1.
National institutional context is defined in this paper as the combination of nationally based
requirements, such as legal, regulatory and professional factors, that must be adhered to in a
particular jurisdiction (Thorne and Bartholomew-Saunders, 2002). In organizational settings,
prior research investigating institutional factors that influence individuals’ ethical conduct
suggest the importance of situational variables arising from the immediate job context,
organizational culture and characteristics of the work (Treviño, 1986). In particular, Ferrell and
Gresham (1985) cite rewards and punishments as well as corporate policies as important
determinants of ethical decision-making in organizations. As applied to the institutional context
influencing auditors’ ethical conduct, rewards and punishments are assessed through the legal,
regulatory and professional requirements for the regulation and licensing of auditors.
While Canada and the United States have very similar cultures (Hofstede, 1981, 1990),
auditors in each country face institutional contexts that are distinct along a number of several key
dimensions. Several institutional variations between the U.S. and Canada suggest that the
institutional environment influencing auditors from the two countries is quite diverse. These
1

Bay and Greenberg (2001), Jones (1991), Rest (1999), and Treviño (1986) identify the link between moral
reasoning and moral behavior.
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differences include: 1) distinct professional contexts with dissimilar emphases on principles
versus rules between the two counties, as well as differences in the degree of self-regulation of
the audit profession in the two countries (Brooks, 1997; Wingate, 1997); 2) diverse legal systems
reflecting the judge-based nature of Canadian case law versus the jury-based nature of American
statutory law, and 3) increased regulatory power in the U.S., with Canada not having a national
regulatory body overseeing financial reporting as found in the Securities Exchange Commission
(Needles, 1997).
We use a broad-based random survey of 363 Canadian and American auditors to examine
whether auditors’ moral reasoning varies with national institutional contexts. To develop a
comprehensive understanding of the association between national institutional context and
auditors’ moral reasoning, we use three different measures of moral reasoning: moral
development, prescriptive reasoning, and deliberative reasoning.2 Moral development describes
the most sophisticated moral reasoning of which an individual is capable. Prescriptive reasoning
involves the consideration of what should ideally be done to resolve a realistic moral dilemma,
while deliberative reasoning involves the formulation of an intention to act on a realistic moral
dilemma (Thorne and Bartholomew-Saunders, 2002). The latter two are context-specific
measures of auditors’ moral reasoning, which are needed to develop an understanding of how
auditors actually consider moral dilemmas in the workplace (Arnold, 1997; Shaub, 1997; Thorne,
2000). The use of a broad-based random survey mitigates potential firm-specific effects that may
limit the generalization of findings of prior studies that rely on selective samples (Bernardi and
Arnold, 1997; Jeffrey and Weatherholt, 1996).

2

Thorne and Bartholomew-Saunders (2002) suggest that various aspects of moral reasoning are differentially
influenced by external factors; therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the association between institutional
context and public accountants’ moral reasoning requires an investigation relying on multiple measures of moral
reasoning.
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COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY
Cognitive-developmentalists, generally, concentrate on studying the development of
cognitive reasoning structures that precipitate a moral decision or choice. They believe cognitive
moral capability becomes more sophisticated and complex as additional cognitive moral
structures are acquired. At increasingly mature levels of moral development, individuals evolve
from being primarily influenced by externally prescribed rewards and punishments to being
primarily influenced by internally defined concerns for principles and universal fairness
(Kohlberg, 1979). Kohlberg (1958) identifies three levels of moral development: preconventional, conventional and post-conventional or principled. For pre-conventional
individuals, the moral acceptability of alternative actions is defined by the rewards and
punishments attached. For conventional individuals, moral acceptability of alternative actions is
based upon an interpretation of the group norm. Post-conventional or principled individuals
consider complex notions of universal fairness, despite legal, social, or material implications.
Accounting

researchers

employing

cognitive-developmental

approaches

mostly

investigate factors associated with the moral development of auditors (Louwers et al., 1997).
However, the focus of our paper is on auditors’ moral reasoning, which includes cognitive moral
development as well as prescriptive and deliberative reasoning. Moral development is related to,
but is distinct from prescriptive and deliberative reasoning (Rest, 1994). Moral development
describes the most sophisticated cognitive moral structure an individual is capable of utilizing,
and is not, theoretically, influenced by contextual factors (Rest, 1994). In contrast, prescriptive
and deliberative reasoning describe the cognitive moral structure one individual applies to the
resolution of a particular moral dilemma. According to Rest (1994), prescriptive reasoning
involves considering what should ideally be done to resolve a particular moral dilemma, whereas
deliberative reasoning involves formulating an intention to act on a particular moral dilemma.

5

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
National institutional context often is distinct from culture as a culture may span national
boundaries (e.g., the gypsies of Eastern Europe) and there may be several cultures within one
nation (e.g., in Canada there is a French-speaking and an English-speaking culture). While
Arnold, Bernardi and Neidermeyer (1999) link inter-country differences in auditors’ moral
reasoning to differences in ethical culture (c.f., Hofstede, 1980, 1991), institutional differences
such as legal and regulatory structures, and professional rules and requirements may also play a
role (c.f., Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Holloway et al., 1999). However, most of the evidence
regarding the ethics of auditors is drawn from a single national institutional context, the United
States (Louwers, Ponemon and Radtke, 1997). Thus, it is yet to be determined whether auditors’
moral reasoning is differentially associated with national institutional context.
While Canada and the United States have very similar cultures (Hofstede, 1981, 1990),
auditors in each country face institutional contexts that are distinct along a number of several key
dimensions.3

First, through the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), the

Canadian accounting profession has the authority to enact and implement financial reporting and
auditing standards. By contrast, in the United States, accounting standards are set by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), an autonomous body whose actions are closely
supervised and complemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission, an agency which
mandate emanates from the U.S. Congress. This suggests that the Canadian accounting
profession has more discretion than its’ U.S. counterparts in enacting and implementing
accounting rules and standards.
The events following Enron’s failure illustrate the difference in discretion between the
Canadian and U.S. accounting professions and in their respective ability to control accounting

3

As reflecting differences in the culture of auditors, Arnold, Bernardi and Neidermeyer (1999) find that there are
significant differences between auditors’ responses to ethical dilemmas only on the two dimensions of individualism
and power-distance. These dimensions are similar between Canada and Americans with Canadians scoring 80 as
compared to Americans scoring 91on individualism, and with Canadians scoring 39 as compared to Americans
scoring 38 on power distance (Hofstede, 1991).
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and auditing standards. On the one hand, through the CICA, the Canadian accounting profession
was able to seize the initiative by creating an Auditing Oversight Board (AOB) that will review
auditors’ work on a national basis. By virtue of its being a committee of the CICA, the AOB is
not independent of the Canadian accounting profession, its corporate governance structure and
funding comes directly from the CICA. On the other hand, the U.S. accounting profession saw
the enactment of a new law by Congress that proposed the creation of a new Regulatory Board to
oversee and regulate public accounting and auditing in the U.S. The new Regulatory Board
established by Sarbanes-Oxley is independent of Congress and of the American accounting
profession, through the establishment of an autonomous corporate governance structure that
requires independence in the appointment of those that sit on the Board (no more than 2 out of 5
members can have been public accountants) and self-sufficiency in terms of financing.
Second, Canadian accounting standards rely on a principles-based approach that is less
detailed and emphasizes professional judgment and economic substance over legal form. In
contrast, U.S. accounting standards tend to be more detailed and rule-oriented with extensive
reliance on technical guidance and pronouncements serving as a substitute for professional
judgment.
Third, auditors face a different legal environment in Canada than in the United States
(Brooks, 1997). While both countries rely on a common law framework, each country relies upon
different sources for their common law development. The United States primarily relies upon
statute to determine auditor liability whereas in Canada there is heavy reliance on precedent
(earlier cases) and the courts will use case law of Canada as well as that of the United Kingdom.
Moreover, the United States relies on juries to determine auditor liability (Kadous, 2000). This
contrasts with Canada where audit liability cases are tried by judges. Finally, while class-action
suits and contingent legal fees are an integral part of the U.S. legal system, they are rarely used in
Canada due to structural impediments. Wingate (1997) reports that, in combination, these factors
result in a different level of litigation between the two countries for auditors, with the respective
7

litigation indices for auditors of the two countries to be 8 and 10, for Canada and the U.S.
respectively4.
Fourth, securities laws’ enforcement differs extensively between both countries in two
key respects. For instance, while the regulation of U.S. securities markets is under federal
jurisdiction, Canadian securities markets operate under 13 provincial securities regulators.
Moreover, in contrast to the S.E.C., the Ontario Securities Commission (Canada’s pre-eminent
securities regulator) does not have the legal power to levy fines or to force the disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains. Such legislation is yet to be introduced in Canada (Howlett, 2002). Hence, in
Canada, professional accountants are likely less accountable for their actions to regulatory
agencies.
Our study examines whether the differences in institutional context between Canada and
the United States is associated with a difference in the moral reasoning of auditors from the two
countries5. Previous research shows only one previous study that compared moral reasoning of
Canadian and American auditors. Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) compare the moral development
of 102 Canadian auditors to that of 133 American auditors employed in the same two “Big 6”
audit firms. Figure 1 presents Ponemon and Gabhart’s results graphically.

Figure 1 about here.

As shown in Table 1, results in Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) indicate that, unlike the
inverse U-shaped association between moral development and tenure often found in the
American samples, tenure and moral development are positively associated in the sample
comprising auditors from two Canadian audit firms. Because of the specialized and limited
4

The level of litigiousness found in a country is suggested by the litigation index reported in Wingate (1997). This
index is based upon a risk rating developed by an international insurance underwriter for one of the Big 6 audit
firms. It takes on values based to reflect the legal risk faced by an auditor in a particular country.
5
Because there are several factors that as a whole constitute institutional context, it is difficult during a preliminary
investigation to postulate a directional impact that the respective institutional contexts may have on the moral
reasoning of auditors from the respective countries.
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nature of the sample used in Ponemon and Gabhart’s (1993) study, it is unclear whether these
findings capture organizational or national institutional differences in the moral reasoning of
auditors (c.f., Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Jeffrey and Weatherholt, 1996).

Table 1 about here.

Table 1 also shows that within a specific institutional context there is a difference
between Canadian and American auditors with regard to how tenure and moral reasoning are
related. However, it remains an open question whether institutional pressures (e.g., legal,
regulatory, professional etc.) exerted in the two nations differentially influence the moral
reasoning of members, once they enter the profession. This gives rise to the following
hypothesis:
H1:

The association between tenure and moral reasoning for auditors in Canada is
different from that for auditors in the U.S.
Ponemon and Gabhart (1993, 59) also find that the median level of moral development

for Canadian auditors is higher than that of American auditors. This is consistent with other
research suggesting differences in moral cognition of Canadian and American accountants. For
example, evidence in Salter and Sharp (2001) suggests that Canadian and American accountants
act differently in the presence of information asymmetry and incentive to shirk. Similarly,
Etherington and Schulting (1995) report that Canadian Certified Management Accountants
(CMAs) exhibit higher levels of moral development than American CMAs. Accordingly, the
next hypothesis posits that the moral reasoning of Canadian auditors is significantly different
from that of their American counterparts:
H2: Canadian auditors’ exhibit levels of moral reasoning that are different from
American auditors.
9

Other Factors Impacting Auditors’ Moral Reasoning
Two other factors, previously shown to be associated with auditors’ moral reasoning, are
included in the statistical analysis in this paper: gender (e.g., Gilligan 1982) and political
orientation (e.g., Elmer, et al. 1983). With respect to gender, there is weak prior evidence of an
association between gender and auditors’ moral reasoning. On the one hand, investigations of
American auditors fail to find a significant difference in moral reasoning between genders (e.g.,
Armstrong, 1987; Ponemon, 1992; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993). On the other hand, some studies
find that female auditors have a higher level of moral reasoning than their male counterparts, both
in Canada (Etherington and Schulting, 1995) and in the United States (e.g., Bernardi and Arnold,
1997; Lampe and Finn, 1992; Shaub, 1994; Sweeney, 1995). To ensure that our results may not be
attributed to differences in gender in the respective samples, we control for gender in our analysis.
With respect to political orientation, some evidence suggests an association between
moral reasoning and liberal political orientation (Elmer et al., 1983; Fisher and Sweeney, 1998;
Markoulis, 1989; Rest et al., 1999; Sweeney and Fisher, 1998). This research considers whether
moral reasoning may be associated or influenced by “an imbedded political ideological content in
the instrument unrelated to the assessment of moral judgment” (Sweeney and Fisher, 1998, 139).
Recent research in accounting finds that very little of the variance in accountants’ moral
reasoning can be attributed to political orientation (Bailey et al, 2002; Bernardi et al., 2002). As
the respective socio-economic infrastructures of the two countries are different, with Canadians
being more “liberal” than Americans (Brooks, 1997; Di Norcia, 1997), we control for political
orientation to ensure that this alternate hypothesis does not account for the results’ findings.

10

METHODOLOGY
Sample
Data was collected through a large-scale randomized survey of auditors in Canada and in
the U.S.6 Subjects’ names and addresses were randomly selected from each country’s
membership directory (i.e., CICA and AICPA), according to the year they obtained their
professional certification. All participants have at least one year of audit experience.7 Participants
received a survey that requested them to complete a three-item instrument to measure cognitive
moral capability (i.e., moral development), a four-item instrument to measure audit-specific
moral reasoning, and a questionnaire to gather demographic information. One-half of the subjects
in the sample received the prescriptive form of the audit-specific instrument; the other half
received the deliberative form. The questionnaire to gather demographic information included
questions about age, gender, work experience, and political orientation. Several weeks later, a
post card follow up was sent to all subjects. Participation was entirely voluntary and completely
anonymous. Appendix 1 contains a sample of the survey.

Measures of Moral Reasoning
This research provides a comprehensive picture of the moral reasoning of auditors by
considering each hypothesis, using three different measures: 1) moral development, 2)
prescriptive reasoning, and 3) deliberative reasoning. Although related, moral development and
moral reasoning are distinct constructs (Rest 1986). Moral development, or cognitive moral
capability, describes the most sophisticated moral reasoning of which an individual is capable.
Prescriptive reasoning involves the consideration of what ideally should be done to resolve a
6

All survey questions were identical, however, the surveys differed in their reference to public accountants. In the
survey distributed in Canada, we refer to public accountants as Chartered Accountants (CAs) whereas in the survey
distributed in the United States, we refer to public accountants as Certified Public Accountants (CPAs).

7

Due to the difficulty of translating the research instrument into French, the Canadian sample only included public
accountants with English as a first language. Further research is required to determine the similarities and differences
between the moral reasoning of English- and French-speaking Canadian public accountants.
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particular moral dilemma, while deliberative reasoning, involves the formulation of an intention
to act on a particular moral dilemma.

Cognitive Moral Capability or Moral Development
We use the traditional three-item version of Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT) to
calculate auditors’ P-score, a measure of moral development or cognitive moral capability, as
applied to the resolution of hypothetical moral dilemmas. Researchers interested in measuring
accountants’ level of moral development often rely on the DIT, as do researchers in numerous
studies outside the accounting domain (Rest et al., 1999). The P (for principled) score is the
percentage of principled moral reasoning an individual uses to recommend how a hypothetical
moral dilemma ought to be resolved. Davison and Robbins (1989) report that the P-score’s
reliability varies between 70% and 90% for test-retest situations (within one-to-three week
intervals) and for internal consistency (as measured by Cronbach’s (1951) alpha).

Measures of Moral Reasoning as Applied to Realistic Dilemmas
How an individual makes a moral decision is influenced by situational factors and may
change across domains and due to the intensity of the issue (Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1986).
Because of their hypothetical nature, the dilemmas used in the DIT may not necessarily capture
the moral reasoning used by auditors in the workplace (Massey, 1997). Thus, it is critical to use
context-specific moral dilemmas to gain insights into a moral reasoning process that is
representative of auditors (Shaub, 1997). As there are several facets of auditors’ moral reasoning
that are relevant to their moral decision making, context-specific measures of moral reasoning
may take several forms, including prescriptive reasoning and deliberative reasoning.
Accordingly, to assess accountants’ prescriptive and deliberative moral reasoning in the
workplace, this research relies on an audit-specific instrument that has been developed and tested
by Thorne (2000).
12

There are two versions of the audit-specific instrument: prescriptive and deliberative.
Each version of the instrument is identical to the other except that each elicits one mode of the
accountants’ moral reasoning. The prescriptive version of the audit-specific instrument requests
subjects to consider how auditors should ideally resolve the described dilemmas. The deliberative
version of the audit-specific instrument requests subjects to consider how auditors would
realistically resolve the described dilemmas. Thorne (2000) validates each version of the
instrument. According to Thorne, the reliability, and validity of the audit-specific instrument is
comparable or better than that of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) of a similar length.

Statistical Approach
Tests of our two hypotheses rely on ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance) to examine
whether there is a significant difference in moral reasoning between groups. The independent and
control variables in the ANCOVA include: country (1 for Canada, 2 for the U.S.); sector of
employment (1 for currently employed in public practice; 2 for currently employed outside public
practice); gender (1 for male; 2 for female); political orientation (1 for liberal; 2 for moderate
liberal; 3 for moderate; 4 for moderate conservative; 5 for conservative); and an interaction term
of work years by country. The interaction term is included to test for differences in the
association between tenure and moral reasoning of auditors in each of the two countries.8 DIT Pscore is also used as a control variable in testing prescriptive and deliberative reasoning.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
434 auditors (215 CAs and 219 CPAs) responded to the survey. In Canada, we sent out
1000 surveys; our response rate was 21.5%. In the U.S., the initial mailing of 1000 surveys resulted in 84
responses (for a response rate of 8.4%). To increase our sample size, the survey was administered to

8

Additional statistical analysis included all other interaction terms. They are not reported as there was no significant
difference in the results as presented.
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a second random sample of 1000 American public accountants. One hundred thirty five
responses were received from the second mailing (response rate of 13.5%) for a total of 219
responses from American public accountants (overall response rate of 11.0%). There were no
significant differences in results from the two U.S. samples. Non-response bias was checked by
statistical analysis and through telephone follow-up of a selected group. Power level
computations also suggest that statistical inferences from t-tests and from correlations are
relatively reliable (higher than 0.90) (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1984: 356-365). Among Canadian
responses, eight could not be used due to missing data and twenty-five failed internal validity
checks; so 182 valid responses were received. Nineteen American responses could not be used
due to missing data and another nineteen could not be used because they failed internal validity
checks, resulting in a total of 181 valid American responses. A comparison between responses
from early and late responders does not reveal any significant difference between them in terms
of moral development and moral reasoning. The demographic profile of the sample, in total,
according to country and assignment of prescriptive or deliberative forms of the instrument, is
presented in Table 2. The mean age of the sample is 43.6 years old, mean years of work
experience is 18.6 and 21% of the sample is female. There are no significant differences for any
descriptive characteristic listed in Table 2 for respondents broken-down by version of the
instrument that they received (prescriptive versus deliberative).

Table 2 about here.

RESULTS
Before investigating whether national institutional context differentially associates with
the moral reasoning of auditors in Canada and the U.S., we assess whether the associations
between institutional context and moral reasoning reported in prior research extend to our
sample. In particular, there is prior evidence of a significant association between tenure and
14

auditors’ moral reasoning, both in Canada (e.g., Etherington and Schulting, 1995; Gaa, 1994;
Lemon, 1998; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Thorne and Magnan, 2000) and the United States
(e.g., Armstrong, 1987; Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Lampe and Finn, 1992; Ponemon, 1992;
Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Shaub, 1994). Since previous research is generally based upon
studies that generally rely on selective samples, typically based upon convenience, their findings
may not be generalizable to the population of Canadian and American auditors and to the
national institutional context of the respective countries (c.f., Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Jeffrey
and Weatherholt, 1996). Accordingly, we examine whether there is a significant association
between tenure and moral reasoning, and in particular tenure and moral development as found in
previous research. Figure 2 shows the relationship between tenure and moral development for
Canadian and American auditors in our study.
Figure 2 about here.

A comparison of Figure 2 to Figure 1 suggests that significant differences exist between
the moral development of auditors included in our random survey and those in Ponemon and
Gabhart’s (1993) study. Consequently, we statistically consider this association using three
different measures of moral reasoning: moral development, prescriptive reasoning, and
deliberative reasoning, as shown in Panels A, B, and C of Table 3, respectively.
Table 3 about here.
Consistent with prior findings (e.g., Armstrong, 1987; Lampe and Finn, 1992;
Ponemon, 1992; Ponemon and Gabhart, 1993; Shaub, 1994), results in Panel A of Table 3 show
a significant negative correlation between tenure and moral development for the combined
sample (p ≤ 0.00), as well as for the Canadian (p ≤ 0.02) and American (p ≤ 0.03) sub-samples.

15

Interestingly, also shown on Table 3, we fail to find this association between tenure and
prescriptive reasoning or between tenure and deliberative reasoning, respectively.9

Hypothesis 1
Table 4 shows the results from ANCOVAs between auditors’ moral reasoning and their
tenure, country, and current sector of employment, while controlling for gender and political
orientation.10 There are three panels to Table 4, one for each measure of moral reasoning: Panel A
shows the results of the ANCOVA for moral development, Panel B shows the results of the
ANCOVA for prescriptive reasoning, and Panel C shows the results of the ANCOVA for
deliberative reasoning. The results on Panel A of Table 4 show that moral development is
significantly associated with work years (p ≤ 0.03) and political orientation (p ≤ 0.02). Panel B of
Table 4 shows that prescriptive reasoning is significantly associated with gender (p ≤ 0.04). Panel
C of Table 4 shows that deliberative reasoning is significantly associated with the DIT P-score (p
≤ 0.01), and with work years (p ≤ 0.09), country (p ≤ 0.07) and country*workyear (p ≤ 0.09).
Hypothesis 1 considers whether there is a difference between Canada and the U.S. with
regard to the association between tenure and moral reasoning. Because of a lack of significant
findings in Panels A and B of Table 4 for the interaction term, country*workyear, Hypothesis 1 is
not supported for moral development or for prescriptive reasoning, respectively. However, as
shown in Panel C of Table 4, the interaction term, country*workyear, is significant for
deliberative reasoning. This finding suggests that there is a different association between tenure
and deliberative moral reasoning in Canada than in the United States.

9

Further, Table 3 also shows a marginally significant positive association between tenure and deliberative reasoning
for the Canadian sub-sample (p ≤ 0.07). This result is in the opposite direction, and suggests Canadian public
accountants’ deliberative moral reasoning increases with tenure.
10

Note that DIT P-score is included as an additional control variable in the ANCOVAs for Prescriptive Reasoning
(as shown in Table 4, Panel B) and Deliberative Reasoning (as shown in Table 4, Panel C).
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Table 4 about here.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 posits that the moral reasoning of Canadian auditors is different from their
counterparts in the U.S. The lack of significance for the country variable in Panels A and B of
Table 4 suggests that there is no difference between Canadian and American auditors’ moral
development or prescriptive reasoning, respectively, thus providing no support for Hypothesis 2.
However, as shown in Panel C of Table 4, the country variable is significant (p ≤ 0.07) for
deliberative reasoning. Thus, there is limited and marginal support for Hypothesis 2, which
suggests that there may be differences in the deliberative reasoning of auditors from Canada and
the United States.

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
Given the ongoing investigations into Andersen concerning the Enron debacle and the
increasing pressure to reform the institutional factors that affect auditors, it is becoming more
important than ever to understand whether and to what extent national institutional context
influences the moral reasoning of auditors. Toward that end, we analyze survey data that is drawn
from a large random sample of 363 auditors from both Canada and the United States.
Several inferences can be made from the results of this study. The first is that national
institutional context (e.g., legal environment, and professional regulation and licensing) appears
to be associated with the moral reasoning of auditors. Consistent with broad-based studies
conducted previously, auditors in our random sample exhibit a significant, and negative,
correlation between moral development and tenure, in both Canada and the U.S. This suggests
that changes in the national institutional context of both countries over the past decades has
resulted in individuals with an increasing capacity for moral reasoning being attracted to the
accounting profession (c.f., Thorne and Magnan, 2000). Thus, a key contribution of our study is
17

to identify the importance of institutional factors for affecting the moral development of
individuals entering the profession.
Another contribution of our study is to identify to what extent national institutional
context influences different components of auditors’ moral reasoning. Similar to findings in the
organizational literature that suggest the importance of penalties to ensure ethical compliance
(e.g., Ferrell and Gresham, 1985), our results suggest that institutional factors are more likely to
influence auditors’ deliberative reasoning than their prescriptive reasoning. For example, our
findings suggest that the national institutional context found in the United States, which has an
emphasis on penalties resulting from the tough legal and regulatory environment, appears to
better encourage auditors to deliberate according to what they perceive is “the ideal” judgment
than the national institutional context found in Canada.
The random selection of subjects for this study facilitates the development of a
representative portrait of the moral reasoning of North American auditors, in terms of both
similarities as well as differences between auditors from Canada and the United States. The use of
a broad-based random sampling technique mitigates the effects of firm-specific differences
(Bernardi and Arnold, 1997) and allows U.S. to compare whether there is a difference in moral
reasoning associated with institutional contexts in two nations that are culturally very similar. By
conducting a cross-national comparison of the moral reasoning of Canadian auditors to that of
American auditors, we gain insight into the extent to which U.S.-based research findings are
generalizable to the Canadian context. In addition, studying moral development, prescriptive
moral reasoning, and deliberative moral reasoning, provides insights into which aspects of
auditors’ moral reasoning may be most susceptible to national institutional context.
A few caveats are in order concerning our findings. The first concerns the use of selfreported measures, the limitations of which are well documented. The second caveat concerns the
nature of the sample. The use of anonymous, random, samples resulted in a lower number of
responses than desired, particularly for the initial American sample. However, subsequent
18

sampling, testing for non-response bias, following up with phone calls to the survey participants,
and comparing our findings to those of previous studies of the moral reasoning of U.S. auditors
suggest our findings are representative. Finally, the caveats concerning the limitations of the
cognitive-developmental perspective are also widely documented (see Louwers et al. 1997).
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Table 1: Practicing Public Accountants’ DIP P Score by Rank across the U.S.
and Compared with Canada
Rank
Partner (>6 years experience)

Manager (>5 years experience)

Senior (2-5 years of experience)

Staff-level (1-3 years of
experience)
FIRM AVERAGE
Sources:
a Ponemon and Gabhart (1993)
b Ponemon (1992)
c Shaub (1994)
d Lampe and Finn (1992)
e Bernardi and Arnold (1997)

U.S. DIT score
37.1 c
35.6 a (Big 6)*
32.3 b (national firm)

Canada DIT score
46.7 a*

41.9 b (national firm)
41.9 d (Big 6)
41.4 e (manager)
41.1 3 (senior manager)
38.7 a (Big 6)*
38.5 c (manager)
38.1 c (senior manager)
35.7 b (north-east)
42.2 b
42.2 a
41.4 c
41.1 e
44.7 b
42.6 c
40.2 a
39.8 d
40.0 a*

45.9 a*

43.6 a

43.2 a
44.2 a*

*Statistically significant difference between median DIT score of CPAs and CAs at the same
hierarchical level at 0.05 (from Ponemon and Gabhart 1993).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
Total Respondents
All
Canada
U.S.

Panel B
Prescriptive Respondents
All
Canada
U.S.

Panel C
Deliberative Respondents
All
Canada
U.S.

40 (22%)

34 (19%)

Gender
# female (%)

74 (21%)

Work Experience
In years
-mean
-range

18.6
1-50

17.9
3-36

19.2
1-50

17.9
1-45

17.5
3-36

18.3
1-45

19.2
3-50

18.3
3-34

20.1
3-50

Age
In years
-mean
-range

43.6
22-72

42.9
26-63

44.4
22-72

43.3
22-72

42.9
26-59

43.8
22-72

43.9
26-65

43.0
26-63

44.8
24-65

Political Orientation
(1=liberal, 5=conservative)
-mean
-(standard error)

3.5
(0.1)

3.4
(0.1)

3.5
(0.1)

3.4
(0.1)

3.3
(0.1)

3.5
(0.1)

3.5
(0.1)

3.5
(0.1)

3.6
(0.1)

Moral reasoning measures:
Moral development
• Mean
• (Standard error)

38.3
(0.8)

38.6
(1.2)

38.0
(1.1)

40.1
(1.1)

41.4
(1.6)

38.8
(1.5)

36.5
(1.2)

35.8
(1.8)

37.1
(1.5)

Moral Reasoning
• Mean
• (Standard error)

32.9
(0.7)

31.8
(0.9)

34.0
(1.0)

35.0
(0.9)

33.9
(1.3)

36.1
(1.3)

30.8
(1.0)

29.8
(1.3)

31.8
(1.5)

Sample size

363

182

181

180

90

90

183

92

91

34 (19%) 40 (22%)
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16 (18%) 24 (27%)

18 (20%) 16(18%)

Table 3: Association Between Tenure and Moral Reasoning for Public Accountants
Panel A: Tenure and Moral Development
All Subjects

Canadian Subjects

American Subjects

Pearson correlation coefficient

-0.15

-0.16

-0.15

n*

353

182

171

p-value**

0.00

0.02

0.03

Panel B: Tenure and Prescriptive Moral Reasoning
All Subjects

Canadian Subjects

American Subjects

Pearson correlation coefficient

0.02

0.06

-0.03

n*

173

90

83

p-value**

0.83

0.59

0.40

Panel C: Tenure and Deliberative Moral Reasoning
All Subjects

Canadian Subjects

American Subjects

Pearson correlation coefficient

0.06

0.19

-0.05

n*

180

92

88

0.42
0.07
0.32
p-value**
*Note: Ten subjects failed to provide tenure information and were not included in this analysis.
**Note: when results are in the predicted direction, p-values are one-tailed; otherwise, they are two-tailed.
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Table 4: ANCOVAs for Moral Reasoning

Panel A: ANCOVA for Moral Development
Moral Development = ƒ(work years, country, gender, political orientation)
Source of Variation

Within + Residual
Workyear
Country
Gender
Political Orientation
Country * Workyear
Model
Total

Sum of Squares

Degrees of freedom

72392
1054
48
24
2636
25
4366
76758

336
1
1
1
4
1
8
344

F-Value

Prob. > F

4.89
0.22
0.11
3.06
0.11
2.53

0.03
0.64
0.74
0.02
0.74
0.01

Panel B: ANCOVA for Prescriptive Reasoning
Prescriptive Reasoning = ƒ(DIT P-score, work years, country, gender, political orientation)
Source of Variation

Within + Residual
DIT P-score
Workyear
Country
Gender
Political Orientation
Country * Workyear
Model
Total

Sum of Squares

Degrees of freedom

23564
247
8
276
618
479
78
1557
25121

160
1
1
1
1
4
1
9
169

F-Value

Prob. > F

1.68
0.06
1.87
4.20
0.81
0.53
1.17

0.20
0.81
0.17
0.04
0.52
0.47
0.32

Panel C: ANCOVA for Deliberative Reasoning
Deliberative Reasoning = ƒ(DIT P-score, work years, country, gender, political orientation)
Source of Variation
Within + Residual
DIT P-score
Workyear
Country
Gender
Political Orientation
Country * Workyear
Model
Total

Sum of Squares

Degrees of freedom

29350
1350
517
614
35
133
526
2528
31878

165
1
1
1
1
4
1
9
174
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F-Value

Prob. > F

7.59
2.90
3.45
0.20
0.19
2.96
1.58

0.01
0.09
0.07
0.66
0.95
0.09
0.13

Appendix 1: Sample of The Survey Instrument
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Here are an illustration case and sample questionnaire.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Simon Fellows is thinking about buying a house. He is married, in his early thirties, has
two small children, and earns an average income. No additions to his family are planned.
His family has two cars and his wife works. Simon comes to you for advice as to whether he
should or should not buy a house.
Should Simon buy a house? (Check one)

X Yes

__Can't decide

__No

In the process of advising Simon whether or not he should buy the house, you may consider
many different issues to be important. Below is a list of some of these issues. On the lefthand side of each statement check the space which best corresponds to the importance you
believe should be given to the particular consideration. (For instance, if you think that
statement #1 should be of great importance in making a decision about buying a house, check
the space on the left).
IMPORTANCE:
Great

Much

Some

Little

No

X
X

X

1.Whether Simon can afford a suitable house. (Note
in
this
example,
the
person
taking
the
questionnaire thought that Simon should place
great weight on this consideration in reaching his
decision).
2.Whether the furnace on the house was thermal
dynamic (Note that if a statement sounds like
gibberish, nonsense or is not relevant to the
question at hand, mark it of "no importance").
3.Whether Simon could still go on his annual golf
vacation.
4.Whether Simon’s wife wants to buy a house.

X

From the list of considerations above, select the most important to the decision choice.
Put the
number of the most important consideration on the blank beside "Most important.” Do likewise for your
2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important choices.
For example, from the list above, the four most important could be ranked as follows:
1 MOST IMPORTANT

4 SECOND MOST IMPORTANT

3 THIRD MOST IMPORTANT

2 FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT

Note in this example, the top choices will come from those statements that were checked on the lefthand side--statements #1 and #4 were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most
important, a person would reread #1 and #4 and then pick one of them as the most important, then put
the other one as "second most important", and so on). Statement #3 was of the next highest importance
(some importance); therefore, #3 would be put beside the "third most important" choice. Finally,
statement #2 was of the fourth highest importance; therefore, #2 would be put beside the "fourth most
important" choice.
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ALICE AND THE ABC COMPANY
Alice is a senior auditor and a CA for a national CA firm that provides auditing, tax and consulting
services.
The firm has developed a package called the ACME ACCOUNTING SYSTEM that is sold to the
general public as well as the firm's clients. Alice is the auditor in charge of the fieldwork on the
ABC Company, Inc. audit. During the course of this audit assignment, Alice is asked to evaluate the
quality control of the accounting system that happens to be the ACME package. Alice uncovers several
severe control weaknesses in the ACME system.
Before rendering the management letter to ABC
management, Alice is told by her boss to modify the negative comments regarding the ACME package.
Ideally, should Alice amend the management letter? (Check one)
___Should amend it ___Can't decide

___Should not amend it

In the process of advising Alice whether or not she should amend the management letter, many items
need to be considered. Below is a list of some of these items. Please indicate the importance of each
of the following considerations:
IMPORTANCE:
Great

Much

Some

Little

No
1.Whether the weaknesses in the ACME system may be
easily remedied by compensating controls.
2.Wouldn’t a good employee defer to her superior’s
judgment.
3.Whether Alice’s job may be
refusal to revise the letter.

threatened

by

her

4.Whether
fair
deliberation
on
the
client’s
financial position can predilect professional
reputation.
5.What is best for Alice’s firm?
6.Whether or not Alice has a duty to ensure the
management letter is accurate?
7.What is the potential value of an independent
audit in lieu of society’s current perspective on
an enterprise’s net worth?
8.How is society best served?
9.Whether clients really care about internal
control or if all they ever really want is a clean
audit opinion.
10.Would
amending
the
management
letter
consistent with what Alice thinks is right?

be

11.What action would Alice’s peers in the audit
firm expect her to make?
12.What
factors
are
relevant
in
Alice’s professional responsibility?

determining

From the list above, rank the four items of greatest importance to an "ideal" response:
___MOST IMPORTANT

___SECOND MOST IMPORTANT ___THIRD MOST IMPORTANT
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___FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT

